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What is the relation between philosophical concepts and events? This is a complex 
problem in Deleuze’s philosophy, leading to a number of complex questions. Deleuze 
has famously defined philosophy as the creation of concepts, as “knowledge through 
pure concepts.”1 What is at issue here is not a theory of concepts as such, but the type 
of knowledge produced by the pure concepts of philosophy.  One can certainly think 
without concepts, Deleuze says, but as soon as there are concepts in this sense, there is 
philosophy. “So long as there is a time and a place for creating concepts, the operation 
that undertakes this will always be called philosophy, or will be indistinguishable from 
philosophy, even if it is called something else.”2 Philosophical concepts, however, are 
defined by Deleuze in terms of events: “The concept speaks the event, not the essence 
or the thing.”3 At one level, this definition appeals to the traditional opposition 
between essences and events or accidents: concepts will henceforth express events and 
not essences. “For a long time one made use of concepts in order to determine what a 
thing is (essence). On the contrary, we are interested in the circumstances of the thing:  
in what case, where and when, how, etc.?  For us, the concept must express the event, 
and no longer essence.”4 Or, as Deleuze writes at one point, “One can conserve the 
word essence, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is 
precisely the accident or the event.”5 But this manifest distinction between essence and 
event conceals a more subtle distinction between a pure event and an actualized event: 
philosophical concepts, says Deleuze, express pure events. At several points, Deleuze 
distinguishes between the actualization of an event in a state of affairs, that is, in 
history; and the pure event, which is irreducible to its actualizations – the event in its 
becoming, in its specific consistency, which escapes history and is “utopic,” both now-
here and no-where (a play on Samuel Butler’s utopian neologism Erewhon). It is 
precisely the latter, according to Deleuze, that philosophy is able to express in a self-
positing or self-referential concept. But what then is a pure event? How do concepts 
provide knowledge of pure events? And what kind of knowledge is thereby given to us? 
On this score, Paul Patton has provided a useful Deleuzian analysis of the political 
concept of “revolution,” taking as his point of departure Kant’s famous reflections on 
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the French Revolution in The Contest of the Faculties (a text which, in recent history, 
has been taken up by thinkers as diverse as Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, and Lyo-
tard). Kant distinguished between, on the one hand, the pure concept of revolution in 
favor of the universal rights of man, as this was expressed in the “enthusiasm” of 
Europeans for these ideals (this is what constitutes their “becoming” in relation to the 
concept); and on the other hand, the manner in which those ideas and the concept of 
revolution had been actualized in the bloody events of 1789 (history). Patton reformu-
lates this Kantian distinction between spectator and actor into properly Deleuzian 
distinction between an event and a state of affairs, showing how the concept of 
“revolution” necessarily has a double structure. One the one hand, there is the concept 
insofar as it refers to or designates an actualized state of affairs (e.g., the actual events of 
the French Revolution in 1789), in which the concept is capable of effecting move-
ments of relative deterritorialization within history, movements that can themselves be 
blocked or reterritorialized (the “betrayal” of the revolution, its inevitable disappoint-
ment); on the other hand, there is the concept insofar as it expresses a “pure event” 
that posits revolution as an absolute deterritorialization, a self-referential movement of 
pure immanence, a “pure reserve” that is never exhausted by its various actualizations.6 
Deleuze uses the term utopia to designate the “critical point” at which these two 
aspects of the concept are brought together: the point where the absolute deterritoriali-
zation expressed by the concept is connected with the present relative milieu. “To say 
that revolution is itself a utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, some-
thing that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it 
is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement, and absolute survey, 
but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the 
struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is 
betrayed” (Deleuze and Guattari 1999: 100).  
It would be easy, however, to quickly assimilate this distinction between pure and 
actualized events to several traditional analytics of the concept: the concept is a 
generality, and events are particulars; the concept expresses a universal, of which 
particular events are instantiations; the concept expresses a regulative ideal, which 
actual events approximate to a greater or lesser degree; and so on. In this views, the 
pure event would more or less function as a kind of invariant, in relation to which its 
actualizations would appear as so many variants. Deleuze, however, pursues a different 
path. On the one hand, he tells us, concepts are neither universal nor general but 
singular. According to Deleuze, this is a feature philosophical concepts share with 
scientific functions and artistic creations. In defining philosophy as the creation of 
concepts, or science as the creation of functions, Deleuze has in effect defined these 
domains in terms of a creative activity that has often been reserved for art alone. Just as 
a musician works with sound, a painter with line and color, and sculptor with clay, 
stone, or metal, the philosopher is someone who works with concepts, who creates 
concepts that respond to true problems. Concepts in this sense are the very matière of 
philosophical activity. And the products of these creative activities in art, philosophy, 
or science are themselves singular, which is why they bear signature of their creators: 
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philosophical concepts and scientific functions are signed, just as paintings bear the 
signature of their painter. We speak of Descartes’s cogito and Leibniz’s monad in 
philosophy, and of Brownian motion, Fermat’s last theorem, and the Feigenbaum 
number in science, just as we speak of a Cézanne still life or Van Gogh’s sunflowers in 
art. The role of proper names in art, philosophy, mathematics, and science testifies to 
the singularity of their respective creations. The proper name, however, refers less to the 
person than to what they have created, invented, or discovered:  a work of art, a 
scientific function, or a philosophical concept. It expresses, in short, a non-personal and 
singular mode of individuation. 
On the other hand, Deleuze tells us, though singular in their mode of individua-
tion, philosophical concepts are nonetheless multiple in their mode of constitution: 
concepts themselves are multiplicities. “It’s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things 
under a single concept,” Deleuze explains, “but rather of relating each concept to the 
variables that explain its mutations.”7 This characterization takes us to the heart of our 
problem, since it is because concepts are multiplicities that they express pure events. 
But at this point we encounter a difficult secondary problem in the interpretation of 
Deleuze that, to my knowledge, has gone largely unaddressed. What is the relation 
between the theory of concept presented in What is Philosophy? (1991) and the theory 
of Ideas presented in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition (1968)? Both 
concepts and Ideas are presented as “multiplicities,” which might initially lead one to 
suspect that the shift from “Idea” to “concept” was merely terminological: what 
Deleuze presented as an “Idea” in 1968 would more or less be the equivalent of the 
notion of the “concept” presented in 1991. I do not believe, however, that this is the 
case. A concept is always created or invented under the constraint posted by the 
confrontation with a problem, and the theory of Ideas presented in Difference and 
Repetition is nothing other than a theory of the status and constitution of problems. 
Concepts are created under the constraint of a problem, but problems are themselves 
encountered as Ideas. It is because created concepts and problematic Ideas are both 
constituted as multiplicities that allows Deleuze to establish a rigorous internal relation 
between them. In order to understand the Deleuzian notion of a concept, then, we 
must first examine the means by which Deleuze “deduced” the notion of the Ideas (as 
problems) from the traditional notion of the concept itself. 
 Traditionally, concepts have been defined in terms of both their comprehension and 
their extension. The comprehension of the concept is the set of predicates that are 
attributable to the object of the concept; the extension of the concept is the number of 
exemplars that are thereby subsumed under the concept. The logic of the concept 
implies that comprehension and extension have an inverse relation to each other: the 
greater the extension, the smaller the comprehension, and vice-versa. The comprehen-
sion of the concept “lion,” for instance, might include predicates such as “is a mam-
mal,” “has a large mane,” “emits loud roars,” “sleeps a lot,” and so on.  Thus defined, 
its current extension might be, say, ten thousand lions. However, if I limit myself to 
the lions living in the Sahara Desert (a specification of the concept), I reduce the 
extension of the concept, but have thereby enlarged the comprehension of the concept 
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by including within it the predicate “living in the Sahara Desert,” and the lions living 
in the Sahara will no doubt have particular characteristics not shared by other lions. In 
general, most philosophers have agreed that there is a logical point at which the 
comprehension of the concept must stop. This is a quid juris question: you can 
prolong the comprehension of the concept indefinitely, but in principle you can never 
reach the individual lion as such. Why not? The answer to this question would 
constitute the principle of individuation. According to certain Aristotelians, the 
principle of individuation is to be found, not in the form, which is the form of the 
concept, but rather in the accidents of matter. To reach the individual, accidents and 
contingencies must be made to intervene, that is, attributes that do not belong to the 
concept. No matter how far you go in the comprehension or specification of the 
concept, there will always be several individuals subsumed under the concept, if only in 
principle. Even if we arrive at a state of the world in which there remains only one lion, 
the concept can never be pushed so far as to grasp the individuality of this single lion. 
This is what Deleuze calls, in Difference and Repetition, the “blockage” of the concept. 
You can expand the comprehension of the concept indefinitely, but you can never 
reach the point where extension = 1. Every concept necessarily has an extension = x. 
 But what then is it that “blocks” the concept? What prevents the concept from 
reaching the individual? “Who blocks the concept,” asks Deleuze, “if not the Idea?”8 
The theory of Ideas put forward by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition is developed in 
part to explain the sufficient reason of this conceptual blockage. “Any hesitation 
between the order of the Idea and the order of the concept is disastrous.”9 Deleuze’s 
great precursor in this effort, by his own admission, was Leibniz. Leibniz was the first 
philosopher to attempt to define the concept as individual (Adam, Caesar). How was 
he able to make this claim? By explaining that the comprehension of the concept does 
not go on indefinitely, but is actually infinite. What blocked the concept is not simply 
the matter that goes beyond the conceptual form, but the threat of actual infinity in 
the conceptual form itself. Aristotle had already seen, in other words, that the concept 
can become individual only at the point where its comprehension = ∞ and its exten-
sion = 1. This definition of the concept became possible for Leibniz only because he 
was able to posit an actual infinity everywhere: every individual substance, or monad, 
envelops the infinity of predicates that constitute the states of the world. The monad is 
the individual unity filled with an infinite multiplicity – or rather, the individual is the 
concept insofar as it has an actually infinite comprehension, and thus an extension = 1.  
It is one and the same thing to say that the concept goes to infinity and that the 
concept is individual. Using mathematical symbolism, we could say that the individual 
is 1/∞ (whereas in Leibniz God is the inverse of the monad, ∞/1). Leibniz was able to 
reconcile the concept and the individual because, in his philosophy, the comprehen-
sion of the concept is not simply continued indefinitely, but is actually infinite.  
However, according to Deleuze, Leibniz’s theological and rationalist presuppositions 
prevented him from carrying his exploration of sufficient reason to term. In Leibniz, 
the three great terminal concepts of metaphysics (God, World, Self) are preserved in 
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such a way that the Leibnizian “Idea” preserves the rights of representation and the 
Cartesian principle of the clear and distinct: God is the being who comprehends an 
actual infinity of possible worlds, and chooses the “best”; the World itself is an actual 
infinity, which only exists in the actual infinity of each monad (Self) that expresses it. 
 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze reformulates the theory of Ideas in a way that 
eliminates these three metaphysical presuppositions, resulting in an immanent and 
differential theory of the Idea as problematic. God is no longer a being who compares 
and chooses the richest compossible world, but now becomes a pure Process that 
affirms incompossibilites as belonging to a single world. The World is no longer a 
continuous world defined by its pre-established harmony; instead, divergences and 
bifurcations must now be seen to belong to one and the same universe, a chaotic 
universe in which divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths, and give rise to 
violent discords and dissonances that are never resolved into a harmonic tonality: a 
“chaosmos,” as Deleuze puts it (borrowing a word from Joyce) and no longer a world.  
Individuals, finally, rather than being closed upon the compossible and convergent 
world they express from within, are now torn open, and kept open through the 
divergent series and incompossible ensembles that continually pull them outside 
themselves. The “monadic” individual, as Deleuze puts it, becomes the “nomadic” 
individual. “Instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in 
virtue of the identity of its concept, each ‘thing’ is open to the infinity of predicates 
through which it passes, and at the same time it loses its center, that is to say, its 
identity as a concept and as a self.”10 The Leibnizian notion of closure, in short, is 
replaced by the Deleuzian notion of capture. For Deleuze, “bifurcations, divergences, 
incompossibilities, disaccords belong to the same variegated world, which can no longer 
be included in expressive unities, but only made or unmade following prehensive unities 
and according to variable configurations, or changing captures. In a single chaotic 
world, divergent series trace always bifurcating paths [...]. Beings are torn apart, 
maintained open by the divergent series and incompossible sets that take them outside 
themselves, rather than being closed on a compossible and convergent world that they 
express from within. In this sense, modern mathematics have been able to develope a 
‘fibered’ conception, according to which ‘monads’ experiment with the paths in the 
universe and enter into the syntheses associated with each path. It is a world of 
captures rather than closures.”11
 But how can Deleuze say that “incompossibles” (either ... or) belong to one and the 
same world? This is obviously impossible at the level of the “actual” world, in which 
only one side of a logical either/or can exist. But it is possible at the level of “virtual” 
problems, and Deleuze theory of problematics draws on a long tradition in mathemat-
ics – pioneered by Abel, Galois and Poincaré, among others – that examined the 
nature of problems as such, apart from their solution (or more acutely, the notion of 
problems without solution). Put simply, in the theory of differential equations, the 
conditions of the problem posed by the equation is determined by the existence and 
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distribution of singular points in a differentiated topological field (a field of vectors), 
where each singularity is inseparable from a zone of objective indetermination (the 
ordinary points that surround it). In turn, the solution to the equation will only appear 
with the integral curves that are constituted in the neighborhood of these singularities, 
which marks the beginnings of the differenciation or actualization of the problematic 
field. In this way, the ontological status of the problem as such is detached from its 
solutions: in itself, the problem is a multiplicity of singularities, a nested field of 
directional vectors which define the “virtual” trajectories of the curves in the solution, 
not all of which can be actualized. Non-linear equations can thus be used to model 
objectively problematic or indeterminate physical systems, such as the weather 
(Lorenz): the equations can define the virtual “attractors” of the system (the intrinsic 
singularities toward which the trajectories will tend in the long-term), but they cannot 
say in advance which trajectory will be actualized (the equation cannot be solved), 
making accurate prediction impossible. A problem, in other words, has an objectively 
determined structure (virtuality), apart from its solutions (actuality).12
 Beyond Leibniz, Deleuze innovation is to have defined such problems-Ideas in 
terms of the notion of virtuality, rather than possibility (which can still be articulated 
in a concept), and to have broken the principle of the “clear and distinct” into two 
irreconcilable halves: a problematic Idea is clear only insofar as it is confused, and 
distinct only insofar as it is obscure. In other words, there is always an excess of the Idea 
over the concept, and it is this excess that accounts for the blockage of the concept: “It 
is the excess in the Idea [or problem] which explains the lack in the concept.”13 In this 
sense, Deleuze’s theory of Ideas forms a necessary propadeutic to his theory of the 
concept. Being necessarily presents itself in a problematic form, as a problem; but 
problems, as Ideas, always exceed the comprehension of the concept. Ideas and 
concepts are both multiplicities; but concepts are created by selecting certain singulari-
ties-events from the Idea, and never exhaust the “pure reserve” of problems-Ideas. Put 
simply, the concept is a case of solution of a problematic Idea, it takes the chaotic or 
nomadic virtuality of an problematic structure and renders it consistent. 
 With this Idea-concept relation reestablished, we can now return, more fully armed, 
to our question of how concepts express pure events. Concepts, we were saying, are 
multiplicities. “There are no simple concepts,” Deleuze writes, “Every concept has 
components and is defined by them.14 The Cartesian concept of the cogito, for 
instance, has three components, namely, doubting, thinking, and being. The compo-
nents of this concept (doubt, thought, being) can in turn be grasped as concepts, with 
their own components. Concepts can therefore extend to infinity, and, as Deleuze 
insists, are never creating from nothing. Even in Descartes, the concept of the cogito 
can be said to express a pure event that has been extracted from a state of things, 
“counter-actualized,” and thus does not and cannot have a referent: it “posits itself in 
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itself – it is a self-positing” and thus constitutes for Descartes “the always-renewed 
event of thought.”15 It is this status of the concept as expressing a pure event that poses 
the challenge to Deleuze’s own analytic of concepts. If concepts are multiplicities, how 
are we to understand the nature of the components of the concept and the relation 
these components have with each other (consistency)? “The clearest, easiest answer to 
this question of consistency (‘What holds things together?’),” Deleuze has written, 
“seems to be provided by a formalizing, linear, hierarchized, centralized arborescent 
model.”16 In the set theoretical model of concepts, for example, concepts are defined as 
classes, with their components defined extensionally or referentially, and their consis-
tency defined logically. Since none of these options are open to Deleuze, his analytic of 
concepts constitutes a fundamental realignment of the traditional theories of the 
concept. For our purposes, we can briefly examine in turn the two modes of consis-
tency (endo- and exo-) by which Deleuze defines the concept. 
 1. Endo-consistency. Put succinctly, as a multiplicity, a concept is composed of a 
finite number of distinct, heterogeneous, and nonetheless inseparable components; it is 
the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of these component elements 
(symptoms, signs), which it renders consistent in itself; and this internal consistency in 
turn is defined by the zones of neighborhood or indiscernibility that it creates between 
these components. These are the three aspects that define the endo-consistency of a 
concept, which we can briefly examine in turn.  First, the components of the concept 
are neither constants nor variables, but pure “variations,” they are neither general nor 
particular, but pure and simple “singularities.” As opposed to the extensional character 
of concepts in the set theoretical model, for Deleuze, the components of a concept are 
intensive, that is, they do not introduce any division into the concept as such.  Second, 
the internal relations of the concept, which are established between these components, 
are neither relations of comprehension nor extension, but rather relations of “intensive 
ordination.” “Components remain distinct, but something passes from one to the 
other, something that is undecidable between them. There is an area ab that belongs to 
both a and b, where a and b become indiscernible. These zones, thresholds, or 
becomings, this inseparability, define the internal consistency of the concept.”17 In the 
concept of the cogito, for example, there is a zone of neighborhood that marks the 
passage between doubting and thinking (I who am doubting cannot doubt that I 
think), and another between thinking and being (in order to think it is necessary to 
be). Moreover, each of these components is marked by its own zones or phases: first 
there are the various phases of doubt (perceptual, scientific, obsessional), then the 
various modes of thought (feeling, imagination, ideational), and finally the various 
types of being (infinite being, finite thinking being, extended being). Third, if the 
concept can be said to express a pure event, it is because, within the concept itself, 
none of these concepts are separable from each other (changing one of the components 
would effectively change the concept itself. Thus, the concept itself is what Deleuze 
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16 Gilles Deleuze and Félix, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 327. 
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calls, following Ruyer, un point en survol absolu, a point that “hovers” absolutely over 
the traits of which it is composed, without any distance being introduced between 
them (“it does not have spatio-temporal coordinates, but only intensive ordinates”).18
 2. Exo-consistency. Every concept, a pure event, refers to other concepts; they coexist 
with other concepts on what Deleuze calls a “plane of immanence.” Concepts thus 
have an exo-consistency both in terms of their “external” history (which changes when 
its components change, or when the plane of immanence or problematic to which it 
belongs changes) as well as their “internal” becoming (the components of a concept 
can in turn be taken as concepts, to infinity). The Cartesian cogito is not only 
composed internally of certain components that can themselves be taken as concepts 
(doubt, thought, being), but these components themselves establish internal bridges 
with other Cartesian concepts, almost like a hypertext. In Descartes, the “idea of 
infinity” is the bridge leading from the concept of cogito to the concept of God, which 
is a new concept which has three components forming the “proofs” for the existence of 
God. In turn, the third proof (the ontological proof) not only assures the closure of the 
concept of God, but also throws out a new bridge to the concept of extension, insofar 
as it is the closure of the concept of God that guarantees the truth value of our other 
clear and distinct ideas, such as the idea of the external world. Concepts of pure events 
can become modified or recast when they are brought into relation with new concepts 
or a new problematic field, or when a new component is added to a concept. When 
Kant “criticized” Descartes, he did so in the name of a problematic field what could 
not be occupied or completed by the Cartesian cogito. Kant argued that if the “I 
think” is a determination that implies an undetermined existence (“I am”), we still do 
not know how this undetermined comes to be determinable and hence in what form it 
appears as determined. Kant in this way introduces a new component into the cogito: 
it is only in time that my undetermined existence is determinable. In this way, he 
inserted the concept of the cogito into a new problematic field, resulting in its 
transformation into the concept of the transcendental subject. Concepts thus possess 
an internal history, a potential for transmutation into other concepts, which consti-
tutes the history of philosophy. “The history of philosophy means that we evaluate not 
only the historical novelty of the concepts created by the philosopher, but also the 
power of their becoming when they pass into one another.”19
These two aspects of concepts – their endo- and exo-consistency – are, however, 
purely formal characterizations, and the import of Deleuze’s notion that concepts 
express pure events can perhaps be better illustrated by means of some specific 
examples. Here again, Paul Patton has provided a useful application of Deleuze’s 
analytic of concepts to the familiar political notion of the social contract. Stated 
summarily, a Deleuzian analysis of the concept would analyze the following aspects: its 
intensive components, (e.g., the state of nature, the restless desire for power; the 
artificial person that results from the contract); its internal consistency (the zones of 
neighborhood that link these components together internally, e.g., it is the untenability 
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19 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 32. 
 
 
DANIEL W. SMITH: “KNOWLEDGE OF PURE EVENTS” 
 
371 
of the state of nature that induces me to establish the social contract, etc.); its plane of 
immanence or exo-consistency (the way the concept of the social contract links up 
externally with related concepts such as sovereignty, legitimation, justice, etc.; the “exo-
consistency” of concepts).20 The critique of a concept can take place at any of these 
levels: one can add, subtract, or transform the components, or alter the relations 
between them. For instance, in Locke’s version of the social contract, subjects are no 
longer determined by the desire for power, as in Hobbes, but rather by their ownership 
of property – a change in components – which in turn implies obligations toward 
oneself and others – a change in consistency. This is a good example of the transforma-
tive process through which concepts can be rejuvenated and renewed throughout 
history. Finally, Patton emphasizes the fact that, in all these aspects, concepts always 
derive their necessity from historically determined problematics: whereas Hobbes 
problematic was the constitution and legitimation of civil authority, for instance, John 
Rawls’ problematic in A Theory of Justice concerns the principles of a just society, in the 
context of which Rawls himself would take up and transform the concept of the social 
contract yet again.21
 One finds an early example of such a conceptual analysis in Deleuze’s own work – 
namely his analysis of the clinical concept of “sado-masochism.” Long before the 
publication of the book of the same name, Deleuze had often spoken of a project in 
which he would link the “critical” and the “clinical.” “The critical (in the literary sense) 
and the clinical (in the medical sense),” he predicted, “may be destined to enter into a 
new relationship of mutual learning.”22 In psychiatry, the names of Sade and Masoch 
had been used to designate two “perversions,” and Deleuze suggests that the principles 
behind this labeling process deserve close analysis. While some diseases are named after 
typical patients, such as Lou Gehrig’s disease, more often they are designated by the 
name of the doctor who first constructed a clinical concept of the illness: Parkinson’s 
disease, Roger’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, Kreutzfeld-Jacob’s disease. The doctor 
does not invent the disease; rather, he or she forms a clinical picture of a new disorder 
or illness by dissociating symptoms, that were previously grouped together and 
juxtaposing them with others that were previously dissociated. The doctor, in short, 
constructs a concept. In the language of Deleuze’s analytic, the components of concept of 
the disease are the symptoms, the signs of the illness; and the concept becomes the 
name of a “syndrome,” which marks the meeting-place of these symptoms (their point 
of “absolute survey”). In medicine, an accurate etiology depends first of all on rigorous 
symptomatology, since it is on the basis of a symptomtological analysis that the 
concept of the disease is established, and the inseparability of its components (symp-
toms) is recognized. The thesis of Deleuze’s study, however, is that the oft-utilized 
notion of sado-masochism is a crude concept that fails to satisfy the demands of a 
rigorous symptomatology. The belief in a sado-masochistic entity, Deleuze suggests, 
                   
20 We have not discussed the crucial Deleuzian notion of conceptual personae, which in the context of 
political philosophy might include the Leviathan, the Noble Savage, the Prince, and so on. 
21 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, pp. 13, 21. 
22 Gilles Deleuze: Masochism. Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 
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was grounded in pre-Freudian thinking that relied on hasty symptomatological 
assimilations and faulty etiological interpretations – which psychoanalysis, rather than 
questioning, simply helped to make more convincing. Basing his analyses instead on a 
close reading of the texts of Sade and Masoch, Deleuze offers a sharp conceptual 
critique of the concept of sado-masochism, showing that it is a false concept that does 
not meet the criteria of his own conceptual analytic. Coldness and Cruelty is the book in 
which Deleuze engages most directly in a sustained conceptual analysis, and as such it 
provides a useful case study of the theory of the concept provided in What is Philoso-
phy?. Each of its eleven chapters examines a specific component of sado-masochistic 
concept (the nature of the ideal, their use of language, the role of descriptions, their 
relationship to the law, etc.), and shows that, in each case, the concept of sado-
masochism illegitimately unites components (symptoms) that are in fact specific to 
“sadism” and “masochism” – each of which are irreducible concepts that define 
separate universes, between which there is no communication. The most general 
presumed component of sado-masochism, for example, is the transformative or 
dialectical assumption that the sadistic partner enjoys inflicting pain while the maso-
chist enjoys suffering it (hence the popular joke in which the masochist says “Hurt 
me,” and the sadist replies, “No”). But a differential reading shows that a genuine 
sadist could no more tolerate a masochistic victim than a masochist could tolerate a 
sadistic torturer: the sadistic libertine does not allow his victims to experience pleasure 
(the sadistic victim can never be a masochist), and the masochist requires a mistress 
willing to be molded and educated in accordance with his contractual project (the 
masochistic torturer can never be sadistic).23 There is no possible “zone of neighbor-
hood” that could justify the inclusion of both in a single concept.   
 This clinical example, taken from Deleuzes own work, points to the fecundity of the 
notion that concepts express pure events. In effect, Deleuze’s analytic of concepts 
presents several aspects under which one can comprehend the relation between 
concepts and events. One can examine the way in which a concept is created by being 
extracted from a state of affairs through the process of “counter-actualization.” Or one 
can examine the “becoming” of the concept as such, both internally, in relation to its 
components (the change of a component alters the concept, and constitutes a critique 
of the concept), and externally, in relation to the problematic field that gave rise to it 
(the concept of the social contract changes when it moves from the problem of 
legitimation in Hobbes to the problem of justice in Rawls). Or, finally, one can 
examine the way in which the concept, as a pure event, can nonetheless be actualized – 
or made to intervene – in a state of affairs. It is this latter aspect that Deleuze and 
Guattari have thematized, in part, with their notion of “incorporeal transformations.” 
Such incorporeal transformations do not “refer” to bodies or states of things, nor do 
they “represent” them. Drawing partially on Austin’s theory of the performative, 
Deleuze and Guattari show that, in expressing an incorporeal event and attributing it 
to bodies, one is neither representing nor refering, but “intervening” in bodies in a 
particular way.24 For instance, in a juridical act of sentencing, what takes place before 
                   
23 See Deleuze: Masochism. Coldness and Cruelty, pp. 40-41. 
24 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 86-87. 
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the sentencing (the crime) and what takes place afterward (the punishment) are actions 
and passions affecting bodies (the body of the property, the victim, the accused, the 
prison, and so on); but the transformation of the accused person into a convict is a 
pure instantaneous act or incorporeal attribute that is the “expressed” of the judge’s 
sentence. In a hijacking, the brandishing of a revolver or the execution of hostages are 
actions between bodies; but the transformation of passengers into hostages, and of the 
plane-body into a prison-body, is an incorporeal transformation (a “media event,” 
which testifies to the power of journalists to “create” an event by attributing a sense to 
it). Several recent studies have shown how concepts in the human sciences, expressed 
as pure events, can intervene in bodies in a similar way. Ian Hacking has not only 
analyzed the “counter-actualization” process by which concepts such as “child abuse” 
and “split personality” invented, but has also shown how such concepts, once created, 
had the effect of “making up people” (who became split personalities), thereby creating 
phenomena through an act of what he calls “dynamic nominalism.”25 Arnold David-
son, under a Foucauldian inspiration, has similarly analyzed the emergence of the 
psychiatric concept of “sexuality” in the nineteenth century, and the related concepts 
of perversion (as deviant forms of “sexuality”) that is produced.26 And David Halperin 
has explored the means by which the concept of “homosexuality” was created in 1892 
by Chaddock, and that the effect it produced, through its intervention in bodies and 
their corresponding states of affairs, was to make possible a new “mode of existence” 
(the gay person).27 In effect, Deleuze suggests that philosophical concepts can have the 
same effect: “To read philosophy is to do two things at the same time: to be very 
attentive to the linking of concepts, this is the philosophical reading, but there is no 
philosophical reading that isn’t doubled in a nonphilosophical reading. And the 
nonphilosophical reading, without which the philosophical reading remains dead, 
implies all sorts of sensible intuitions that you must give birth to within yourself, but 
extremely rudimentary sensible intuitions, and for that reason, extremely living 
[vivante].”28 In this sense, this distinction between pure events and states of affairs is 
                   
25 Ian Hacking, “Making Up People”, in: Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and 
the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, with 
Arnold I. Davidson, Ann Swidler, And Ian Watt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 
222-236; “The Invention of Split Personalities,” in Human Nature and Natural Knowledge, ed. Alan 
Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., and Michael V. Wedlin (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 63-85; 
“Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers,” in Humanities in Society 5 (1982), pp. 279-295.  
Hacking has utilized this notion of “intervening” in a similar fashion in Representing and Intervening 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
26 Arnold I. Davidson, “Closing Up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of the 
Psychiatric Style of Reasoning,” in Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, ed. 
George Boolos (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), pp. 295-325; “Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality,” in 
Critical Inquiry 14, pp. 16-48; “How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” in The Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis, ed. Françoise Meltzer 
(Chicago UP, 1988), pp. 39-64. 
27 David M. Halperin, “One Hundred Years of Homosexuality,” in One Hundred Years of Homosexual-
ity and Other Essays on Greek Love (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 15-53. 
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hardly an exclusive one: concepts, even though they express pure events, are nonethe-
less veritable sketches of sensible intuitions. 
 
 
 
 
